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Abstract 
Automation risk prevails less in large cities compared to small cities but little is known about 
the drivers of this emerging urban phenomenon. A major challenge is that automation risk is 
quantified by work-related tasks that allows for measurement through occupation, which is in 
turn implicitly related to local economic structure and to individual career paths. This paper 
examines the role of working in cities on changes in automation risk through individual career 
mobility. Using panel data on Swedish workers, we show that the metropolitan effect of 
reducing automation risk is mainly induced through inter-firm job mobility. Separate estimates 
for different groups show that this effect accrues mostly to native, high-skilled and male 
workers. 
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1. Introduction 
Automation influences labour markets by replacing human workforce in certain tasks (Autor, 
Levy, & Murnane, 2003; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). Whether this threatens existing jobs 
or facilitates creation of new jobs depends on the type of investments into automation, worker 
skills and their potential renewal (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2020a). Because investments into 
technologies as well as the skill level of human workforce typically differ across regions, the 
problem has a necessary spatial dimension. Accordingly, workers in small cities have been 
found to face higher automation risks than workers in large cities (Frank et al., 2018, Crawley 
et al., 2021). Further evidence suggests that investments into labour replacing technologies in 
metropolitan regions lead to employment growth in the long run because robots supplement 
automatable tasks that trigger upgrades in local skills (Leigh et al., 2020). Nevertheless, how 
individuals adopt their skills to avoid the threat of automation and how geography facilitates 
this process is one of the important questions in this quickly evolving, but still largely 
uncovered, field (Frank et al., 2019). 
In this paper, we expand on recent aggregate analyses (e.g., Crawley et al., 2021) by detailing 
the micro-mechanisms explaining the role of agglomeration in relation to regional automation 
vulnerability. Specifically, we look at how working in cities facilitates career upgrades and 
prevents automation risks. We argue that large labour markets create more favourable 
conditions for job mobility, through which individuals are able to reduce their exposure to 
automation. The role of cities in reducing automation risk therefore lies in facilitating upward 
career mobility. According to central tenets in urban economics, two mechanisms take place in 
cities in this regard. First, the demand for non-automatable tasks is high in cities due to their 
functional specialization (Duranton & Puga, 2005). Second, cities are arenas of learning that 
offer additional opportunities for individual workers to advance their career and perform tasks 
that are difficult to replace (Glaeser & Maré, 2001; Gordon, 2015; De la Roca & Puga, 2017). 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
However, workers are not homogenous in their ability to learn in cities, which arguably 
depends on their individual skill base and other personal attributes that may determine career 
mobility. High-skilled workers, for example, can further upgrade skills by learning while low-
skilled workers enjoy the demand for low-skilled non-automatable jobs (MacKinnon, 2017). 
The recent empirical analysis exploits employer-employee matched data covering a 10% 
random sample of the Swedish workforce over the 2005-2013 period. We apply the occupation-
level risk measure introduced by Frey and Osbourne (2017) to quantify how much an individual 
is exposed to automation. Descriptive statistics help us understand the role of cities in getting 
a low-risk job. Further, we apply multinomial logit models of occupation mobility that enables 
us to examine the role of large cities in helping workers to upgrade careers and prevent 
technology-driven displacement. 
Our results show that there are stark differences between small and large regions concerning 
the distribution of high- and low-risk automatable jobs. During this period, Sweden 
experienced a remarkable rise in the share of low-risk jobs that concentrated in metropolitan 
regions with a growing intensity. The largest cities of Sweden accounted for 58% of overall 
job creation between 2005 and 2013, which was 65% in the case of low-risk jobs. Workers in 
large cities have significantly higher chances of getting a low-risk job, which holds when 
controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We find that workers decrease automation 
risk differently, depending on their sex and skill level. Evidence implies that high-skilled male 
workers (at least a college degree) realize dynamic career upgrades suggesting that networking 
and learning in cities helps them prevent automation risk. However, for female workers, low 
educated workers (less than college degree) and immigrants these effects are relatively smaller. 
Our finding that it is much easier for skilled workers to find automation-proof jobs in metro 
areas provide some empirical support for Moretti's (2012) idea that one of the major factors 
behind the spatial selection of skilled workers is the ongoing clustering of new 'innovative' 
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jobs. 
After this introductory section, the paper proceeds in four steps. The next section provides a 
review of the literature that is followed by an explanation of our estimation strategy. The fourth 
section introduces data and sets the stage for the individual-level econometric analysis in the 
fifth section. The paper then ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Static and dynamic career upgrades 
As recent advances in the fields of automation technologies change everyday life, their 
prospective effects on the labour market have, unsurprisingly, become the subject of public 
concern. In a recent OECD report, Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) argue that about 46% (ca 
210 million) of all jobs across 32 different countries face at least a 50% chance of being 
replaced by machines in the near future. At the same time, divergence and increasing regional 
differences characterize regional development in many developed economies (Storper, 2018; 
Iammarino et al., 2019). This accentuates further challenges in sustaining employment and 
welfare in many non-core regions. Although broad discussions in society premise the ’end-of-
work’ by stressing the adverse labour market effects of automation, it is still a matter of 
academic debate how automation will indeed influence labour markets. While some argue that 
the development and widespread adoption of artificial intelligence, robotics and other 
computer-aided manufacturing technologies imply the displacement of workers performing 
’rule-based’ routine tasks (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003; Levy & Murnane, 2004; 
Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Autor, 2014; Heyman 2014; Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018a; 
2019), others emphasize that automation increases the demand for labour in high-skill 
complementary tasks (e.g. programming, maintenance, design), and other seemingly unrelated 
non-tradable activities (e.g. culture, arts, leisure, personal services) through inter-industry 
spillovers (Autor & Salomons, 2018; Moretti, 2010). 
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Whether disruptive technological innovations will influence the future of work independently 
from the location of jobs is however a rarely addressed question. Some studies using aggregate 
data on robot adoption have recently showed that automation reduce the employment share of 
workers performing production-related routine tasks (Graetz & Michaels, 2018; Autor & 
Salomons, 2018; Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2020). Although the absence of detailed data limits 
our understanding on how automation-driven displacement may unfold in the spatial economy, 
these findings suggest that differences across local economies in terms of motivation and 
ability to adopt such technologies might be present.  
Research antecedents on the locational patterns of job-creation suggest that the labour market 
effects of automation could indeed vary across space and hence affect workers differently 
depending on their location. Since production-related routine occupations are easier to manage 
and control remotely by codified rules, they tend to be located on the outskirts of cities or in 
rural areas, where land rents and wages usually are lower (Scott, 2009; Moretti, 2012; Storper, 
2013). At the same time, the demand for both creative and high-skill jobs is higher in cities as 
well as the demand for low-skill service jobs (e.g. catering service workers, childcare workers, 
geriatric nurses, janitors, cleaners, hairdressers etc.) (Scott, 2009). Additionally, technology-
driven job-creation tends to be confined to larger urban areas where related activities, 
innovation capabilities and market knowledge competences have been already present 
(Shutters et al., 2016; Muneepeerakul et al., 2013). Consequently, as with the general 
geography of displacement, small cities and rural areas are likely to be hit harder by job 
displacement via the automation of production-related tasks, while large cities remain resilient 
or could even benefit from the positive employment effects of the on-going technological 
change (Eriksson & Hane-Weijman, 2017; Andersson et al., 2020). 
A recent study on U.S. MSAs corroborates this perspective by showing that small cities have 
higher average automation risk than large cities (Frank et al., 2018). Since the automation risk 
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measures frequently adopted for such empirical analyses are usually calculated at the 
occupation-level (see e.g. Frey & Osbourne, 2017; Arntz et al., 2016), the findings of Frank et 
al. (2018) and other similar studies (see e.g., Henning et al. (2016) for similar Swedish findings 
on regional automation risks and Crawley et al. (2021) for European NUTS regions) should be 
interpreted with caution. The average ‘automation risk’ of a geographical unit (or an industry) 
compresses all the information that the local occupational mix hides within itself. Given that 
the occupational structure of a region is primarily shaped by the local demand for tasks, spatial 
differences in automation risk reflect a set of location-specific attributes and also factors 
associated with the local industry structure. 
The demand for non-automatable tasks tends to be higher in large cities because of functional 
specialization (Duranton & Puga, 2005). Information- and communication technologies (ICT) 
allows firms to rationalize their production in space, move routine tasks offshore and keep only 
managerial tasks, creative activities and their supporting services in the largest cities. Some of 
these jobs do not require high educational attainment but social skills that usually are 
considered as ’bottlenecks’ of automation (Autor, Levy & Murnane, 2003; Levy & Murnane, 
2004; Frey & Osbourne, 2017). Since the overall share of less-automatable jobs tends to be 
higher in cities, workers who move to large cities are therefore expected to have a better chance 
of starting such low-risk jobs. We refer to this as the static upgrade in the career of moving to 
a city which prevails when the worker gets a relatively less-automatable job in a large city 
irrespective whether job search precedes moving or vice versa. Static upgrades can also be 
considered as occupational shifts that cause an one-off reduction in the automation risk by 
allowing workers to find less-automatable jobs in large cities with relative ease.1 Therefore, 
these one-time career upgrades cannot be considered as pure “city-effects” because they stem 
from simply the occupational structure of the local labour demand. 
                                                 
1
 Gordon (2015) labelled this one-off impact of moving to large cities as ‘elevator effects’. 
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Another way through which working in cities contributes to the prevention of automation risk 
is that workers in cities can step ahead in their career within a shorter period of time. Career 
progression in cities particularly depends on jobs that offer access to highly-valued elements 
of tacit knowledge and professional networks (Gordon 2015). That is, being exposed to cutting-
edge skills, gathering experience at top ranked employers and making valuable personal and 
business connections might have long-lasting effects on the career-path and job prospects of 
workers (De la Roca & Puga, 2017). Hence, individuals with urban work experience gain 
access to a wider range of better job positions, or become entrepreneurs easier (Faggio & Silva, 
2014). We refer to these vertical shifts along the career ladder as dynamic upgrades because 
they develop over time through the accumulation of knowledge and networking capital within 
cities. Recently, De la Roca and Puga (2017) provided some indirect evidence on such dynamic 
upgrades by showing that working in cities is associated with faster average wage growth.2 
Since tasks performed at higher levels of the career ladder (e.g., providing expertise, managing 
resources, negotiating, and interfacing with customers etc.) require interpersonal skills of 
different types (Borghans et al., 2008), occupational mobility through dynamic upgrades 
accompanies a reduction of automation risk. 
Note that the mechanisms underlying within-city dynamic upgrades are much more diverse 
than in the case of static upgrades where downward changes in automation risk stem from the 
fact that low-risk jobs tend to concentrate in large cities. Rather, dynamic upgrades in cities 
are, in part, the consequence of learning opportunities (Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser & Maré 2001; 
Gordon, 2015; De la Roca & Puga, 2017), effective information-exchange through social 
networks (Ioannides & Loury, 2004), and increased early-career job turnover (Wheeler 2008). 
Hence, the role of cities in reducing individual automation risk can be grasped through dynamic 
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career upgrades. However, to properly examine the extent to which such within-city upgrades 
help reduce automation risk, one has to rule out other factors determining occupational 
structure, especially unobserved worker heterogeneity. Controlling for worker heterogeneity 
is extremely important because the probability of getting a non-automatable job is likely to 
vary by unobserved abilities. As shown by Heckman, Stixrud & Urzua (2006) and many others, 
non-cognitive abilities and personality traits determine occupational preferences and the career 
path of workers.  
Taking individual characteristics into account when examining dynamic upgrades is also 
important because workers with different backgrounds may benefit from urban career 
opportunities to different degrees. In this sense workers in cities are not necessarily protected 
from technology-induced unemployment to the same extent. As argued by Sicherman and 
Galor (1990) upward career mobility is more likely among educated workers due to their better 
capabilities to adapt to various work situations. Therefore, workers with high educational 
attainment (college degree or more) are expected to be the primary beneficiaries of the dynamic 
upgrades in cities. Beside human capital, however, there are other individual and structural 
factors that determine workers' potential for career mobility (e.g., family background, 
household division of labour, labour market discrimination etc.) These factors may influence 
workers' networking behaviour, access to job information and therefore cause substantial 
differences between women and men, native workers and immigrants in career mobility. By 
examining effect heterogeneity across workers with different attributes one can identify the 
less resilient worker groups that remain susceptible to automation irrespective of their location. 
 
3. Modelling individual automation risk dynamics 
We begin with a simple conceptual framework in which changes in workers' automation risk 
are linked to individual attributes through occupation mobility choices. Since the extent to 
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which workers are exposed to the threat of automation depends mainly on the task-content of 
their jobs, most of the changes in automation risk necessarily stem from movements across 
jobs. More precisely, it comes from job mobility that involves the change of occupation. Hence, 
any factor that influences job mobility options has an indirect effect on individual exposure to 
automation. 
As in Sicherman and Galor (1990), job changes are assumed to result from an intertemporal 
utility maximization problem in which workers seek for a sequence of jobs that form an optimal 
career path. Expected lifetime utility is a function of potential earnings but the choice set of job 
mobility options are constrained by both individual attributes (e.g. personality traits, skills, 
education, family background etc.) and a set of other factors external to the worker. For 
example, intra-firm mobility is uncertain in the sense that within-firm job transfers and 
promotions are subject to the employers’ decision, whereas inter-firm mobility is constrained 
by the availability of local job opportunities. Consequently, at any point in time workers choose 
from a constrained set of mobility options. Then, this choice determines the direction of 
temporal shifts in the worker’s automation risk.  
Consider a panel of i = 1, 2, ..., N workers in which automation probability and other covariates 
are observed for t = 1, 2, ..., T periods. Between any consecutive periods t and t+1, workers go 
through one of the following alternatives described by j: moves to a job with lower automation 
risk (j = 1), moves to a job with higher risk (j = 2), or neither (j = 0). Suppose that, for each 
worker i and transition alternative j there is a continuous measure, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ , that describes the 
feasibility of transition j for worker i. Since each transition alternative results from job changes 
(occupation changes), 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  depends on all factors that influence worker i’s choice set of 
mobility options: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, (1) 
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where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observed variables.
3 Assuming that 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is i.i.d. across all outcomes and 
follows a type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution gives rise to a multinomial logit (ML) 
model where the probability of transition j can be written as: 
 




where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the actual outcome for individual i in period t. As discussed in Section 2, the size 
of the urban labor market may also influence the choice set of individual job mobility. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to include a variable into 𝑥𝑖𝑡 that reflects the size of the urban labor 
market where individual i works. Specifically, we assume that 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡′𝛿𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑗 , where 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a vector of individual attributes (such as sex, age, marital status, educational attainment 
etc.) and 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the individual works in a large 
metropolitan area. Since the paper aims to examine the role of large urban areas in reducing 
automation risk we focus on the identification of 𝛾𝑗 for j = {1,2}. To the extent that working in 
metro areas positively affects mobility into low-risk jobs, one would expect that 𝛾1 has a 
positive sign. Such reasoning, however, raises at least two issues. First, since the probability of 
each transition alternative j is explained by variables observed right before the transition itself, 
𝛾𝑗 coefficients in Eq. (1) capture multiple career-upgrading mechanisms depending on whether 
job mobility between t+1 and t involves changes in location or not. While in the case of workers 
who change jobs within metro areas, 𝛾1 captures the career upgrading effects discussed by 
Fielding (1992) and Gordon (2015), workers who decide to accept a job in a smaller labor 
market, the same coefficient captures the ‘static downgrading effect’ of moving into a rural or 
small urban area where the access to low-risk jobs within a reasonable commuting time is much 
more limited. For the same reason, 𝛾2 might be biased toward zero as well.
4 
                                                 
3
 Sicherman and Galor (1990) used a similar model to investigate the role of education in intra- and interfirm 
career mobility. 
4
 Since learning activities do not necessarily involve job mobility, 𝛾𝑗 coefficients cannot capture the whole 
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A convenient way to identify the career-upgrading effects of cities is using data only for periods 
when workers did not move in or out of the same region type, that is, removing ‘move-years’ 
from the sample. By doing so we can eliminate the one-off static effect of migration and focus 
only on within-city dynamic upgrades that happen during the stay in the same region type.5 
Another issue concerning the estimation of 𝛾𝑗s in Eq. (1) is spatial sorting arising from the 
endogenous location choice of individuals. For instance, it seems plausible that individuals 
with specific career preferences choose to locate in large cities, because they expect continued 
career growth after moving in, or because certain job opportunities are simply not available 
elsewhere (e.g., prestigious jobs in high-tech industries or jobs requiring higher education). At 
the same time, as shown by Bacolod, Blum and Strange (2009), cognitive and social skills are 
rewarded more in large urban areas which might also push workers with such skills toward 
cities. Since these skills are also important determinants of occupational choice (see, e.g. 
Borghans et al., 2008; Heckman et al., 2006), they may also influence the probability of moving 
to a low-risk job. To properly examine the extent to which within-city career upgrading 
mechanisms help reduce automation risk, unobserved worker heterogeneity has to be ruled out. 
A straightforward way to address this issue is introducing worker fixed effects (𝛼𝑖) into Eq. (1) 
which implies the following transition probabilities: 
Pr (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡)  =  
exp(𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽𝑗)
∑ exp(𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽𝑗)𝑗
, 𝑗 = 0,1,2. 
As it is well-known, introducing fixed effects into logit models makes the maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE) inconsistent. However, as shown by Chamberlain (1980), time-invariant fixed 
effects can be eliminated by using a likelihood function that conditions on the counts 𝒔𝒊𝒋 of the 
number of observations for each person i in which 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗. Let 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 be an indicator variable that 
                                                 
spectrum of dynamic career effects discussed in Section 2, only those that result in occupation mobility. 
5
 This strategy follows that of D’Costa and Overman (2014) to identify the urban wage premium. 
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takes value 1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 and define 𝒔𝒊𝒋 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑻𝒊
𝒕=𝟏 . The conditional log-likelihood function to 
be maximized is 
 










 , (3) 
 
where 𝛶𝑖 = {𝑤 = (𝑤11, … , 𝑤𝐽𝑇) | 𝑤𝑗𝑡 = {0,1}, ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗} is the set of all permutations of 
the observed sequence of transitions for individual i. Conditional maximum-likelihood 
estimates obtained by maximizing Eq. (3) are consistent and asymptotically normal, but due to 
the information loss that comes from using only within-group variation, it is not fully efficient 
(Greene 2012).6 Moreover, when fixed-effects are introduced into the model, estimates of 𝛾𝑗’s 
come from the sub-sample of those who moved across region types, because for immobile 
workers location is a time-invariant fixed effect. Since move-years are dropped from the 
sample in order to get rid of the static effect of migration, in the presence of fixed-effects the 
identification of within-city dynamic upgrades is based on the observations that pertain to the 
‘non-move years’ of those who moved to another region-type at least once. 
Given that mobile workers choose from a wider set of suitable job opportunities and therefore 
climb the career ladder much faster (van Ham, Mulder & Hooimeijer, 2001), they might not be 
representative of the whole workforce. Hence, in the presence of individual fixed effects the 
resulting estimates of 𝛾𝑗s cannot be referred to the whole population. Nonetheless, estimating 
Eq. (3) and excluding observations for move years are the best we can do to examine the role 
of cities in reducing individual automation risk.7 Of course, this approach can be used to 
identify the effects of more than one urban category or, indeed, a full set of city-region 
                                                 
6
 Note that, for workers where 𝒔𝒊𝒋 = 𝑇, are not used by the MLE, because their log-likelihood is equal to zero. 
7
 Estimating Eq. (3) also has the drawback that average partial effects cannot be evaluated without specifying the 
distribution of 𝛼𝑖 Therefore, the results are interpreted as odds-ratio effects. 
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dummies. Since figures on the distribution of automation risk (see Figures 1-2) suggest that 
low-risk jobs tend to concentrate in the three Swedish metropolitan areas and a few other large 
cities, in some of the specifications we consider multiple urban categories (metros and large 
urban city-regions). 
 
4. Data and measurement 
We use matched employer-employee data from Statistics Sweden covering the years between 
2005 and 2013. In this data, the annual wages of individuals active on the Swedish labour 
market, as well as their occupations, place of work and place of residence at the municipality 
level are recorded (along with other individual attributes like age, sex, family status etc.). The 
period 2005-2013 is chosen due to two reasons (c.f., Henning & Eriksson 2021): Previous 
accounts have not identified labour market polarization tendencies in Sweden prior to the initial 
year of our analysis, which makes this period particularly suitable for our purpose as we can 
expect substantial occupational shifts to occur. Second, the final year is chosen due to a revision 
in occupation codes from 2013 and onwards which makes comparisons prior and after 2013 
virtually impossible. To define occupations, the 4-digit SSYK-96 occupation nomenclature is 
used which is broadly consistent with the international ISCO-88 classification. 
Workers are allocated to municipalities using the address of the workplace. The municipalities 
are then classified into three region-types; metro areas, large urban areas and small regions. 
The ’Metro areas’ category labels the three largest cities of Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and 
Malmö), ‘Large urban areas’ labels other urbanized areas and university cities such as Umeå, 
Linköping, Karlstad etc. while ‘Small regions’ refers to the remaining, mostly sparsely 
populated, regions of Sweden. Originally, Statistics Sweden distinguishes between five 
categories of which the first and second correspond to our ‘Metro’ and ‘Large’ categories, and 
the rest makes up our ‘Small’ category. We focus on a small number of predefined region 
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categories because in fixed-effects ML models identification relies on observing outcomes for 
workers who move across region types (as discussed in Section 3). Hence, considering a full 
set of region dummies would not be reasonable due the relatively small amount of worker 
mobility in the data. 
As shown in Table A1 in the appendix, almost half of the population resides in the three 
metropolitan regions (49% in 2013) and about 52% of all employees. It is also where the 
greatest job growth has taken place (11.8%), while the number of employees has declined by 
about 1% in the small regions. Although the income levels are lower in the smallest regions 
the employment decrease is accompanied with the greatest relative increase in incomes. 
Manufacturing industries as well as occupations closely connected to manufacturing (e.g., 
machine operators and assemblers belonging to SSYK-codes 7 and 8) has withdrawn in a 
similar pace in all region-types but in the larger regions this is more accompanied with an 
increase in occupations requiring a college degree. This implies a divergence in the structural 
change as manufacturing jobs usually not requiring a college degree are replaced with new jobs 
requiring a college degree in the largest regions while that is not the case in the smallest regions 
(Henning & Eriksson, 2021). It also signals the spatial division of employment in Sweden as 
manufacturing indeed is present in the larger regions but that is often administrative units while 
more of the production units (employing the machine operators and assemblers) to a greater 
extent is found in the smaller regions. 
 
Measuring automation risk 
We measure automation risk using the estimates of Frey and Osbourne (2017) who looked at 
the US Department of Labor’s O*NET database to assess the probability of computerisation 
for 702 elements of the 6-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC).8 Automation 
                                                 
8
 In their study Frey and Osbourne (2017) proposed a mixed methodology that involves both expert evaluations 
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scores were matched to the Swedish data in two steps. We mapped SOC-10 codes onto the 
SSYK-96 classification using official correspondence tables between SOC-00, ISCO-88 and 
SSYK-96. As neither of the conversion tables provide a one-to-one correspondence, in the case 
of multiple correspondences automation scores were averaged out. As a result, 352 (out of 355) 
of the 4-digit SSYK-96 occupations were given a score. 
Although the O*NET dataset offers detailed information on the task content of occupations, its 
limitation for the measurement of automation risk is substantial. Most significantly, it provides 
data on job characteristics at the level of occupations and not workers. Since the actual task 
content of an occupation may vary across regions, it is possible that moving to another region 
type but staying in the same occupation may result in considerable changes in the automation 
risk of the individual. Moreover, workers may acquire new skills to become less susceptible to 
automation. As a result, some employees will be more valuable for the firm than others, even 
within the same occupation.9 Since learning activities does not necessarily involve any form of 
job mobility, the coefficient on workplace location (𝛾𝑗) cannot therefore capture the whole 
spectrum of dynamic career effects discussed in Section 2, only those that result in horizontal 
or vertical occupation mobility. 
Table 1 lists some SSYK-96 occupations from the top and bottom of the automation risk 
distribution. The less-susceptible occupations include medical doctors, psychologists, special 
education teaching professionals, therapists and nurses. Clearly, this group of occupations 
involve tasks such as caring, communication and social perceptiveness. The most susceptible 
occupations, however, involve routine tasks and mostly require physical skills. This group 
                                                 
and machine learning methods. As a first step, a group of AI experts were asked to hand-label 70 occupations, 
assigning 1 if automatable, and 0 if not. Then, the authors identified several O*NET variables that describe the 
level of perception and manipulation, creativity, and social intelligence required to perform these occupations. 
These variables were used to train a machine learning algorithm that provided a probabilistic assessment of 
automation risk for all 6-digit SOC occupations (including the 70 test occupations). Estimates are available in the 
appendix of Frey and Osbourne (2017). 
9
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contains occupations such as manufacturing workers, assemblers and low-skilled clerks. 
The spatial division of labour imply that regions vary considerably in terms of what kind of 
activities are exposed to automation. Table 2 provides a short list of the most common low- 
and high-risk occupations for each region-type. As shown in the upper panel, in metro regions 
the least susceptible occupations mainly refer to sales activities and high-skill occupations 
(such as computer designers, programmers and high-education teaching professionals) while 
in large and small regions preschool and primary-level teaching are the most common low-risk 
activities. Conversely, in small and large urban regions employment in high-risk occupations 
is mostly found among different forms of machine operators and assemblers, while in metro 
regions it concerns clerks and service workers (lower panel). As depicted in Figure 1, these 
occupational disparities between region types concern the spatial concentration of low-risk 
occupations. The larger the region in terms of employment, the greater the concentration of 
low-risk occupations. Comparing 2005 with 2013, we also find indications that average 
automation probability tends to increase in smaller regions while remaining fairly stable in the 
largest ones. Hence, during the period we study in this paper, smaller regions have become 
increasingly susceptible for automation. 
This is partly related to the ongoing spatial division of job creation and destruction in Sweden, 
as the creation of new jobs have been mainly attributed to the large urban regions during the 
last decades (Eriksson & Hane-Weijman, 2017). As shown in Figure 2 (right) employment has 
mainly increased in the largest regions, while the relatively few remaining jobs in smaller and 
peripheral regions to the north-western border and central parts of Sweden is associated with 
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Sample characteristics 
Summary statistics of our variables are reported in Table 3 which distinguishes between movers 
(i.e., those who move at least once across region-types) and stayers (i.e., those who stay in the 
same region-type). Since in fixed-effects multinomial logit models, the identification of region-
type dummies is based on movers only (for reasons discussed in Section 3), it is important to 
see whether there are any systematic differences between the group of movers and stayers. 
Only 12% of the observed workers changed location at least once during the period 2005 to 
2013. The average mover is five years younger than the average stayer (43 years). Workers 
between 16 and 34 years moving for the first job or education are thus more geographically 
mobile (Lundholm, 2007). The largest number of observations can be found in the ’35-44 
years’ age category in the full sample, however, movers concentrate in the category ’25-34 
years’. 48% of the observed workers are women and 43% have at least one child. Along these 
attributes slight differences can be seen between movers and stayers. Among movers there are 
fewer women and parents. One-third of the overall sample have a college degree, while in the 
case of movers the proportion of highly educated workers is 7 percentage points higher (40%). 
On average, 87% of the observations are individuals working in metros or other large cities in 
year t, and metro regions alone represent half of the overall sample. The regional division 
however conceals considerable differences between moving categories. More stayers tend to 
work in metro areas (52%) than movers while more movers locate in large cities (43% 
compared to 36%). These figures, by and large, confirm previous studies on mobility in Sweden 
showing that the main flows are between small and large regions, and large regions and metros, 
respectively (Eriksson & Rodriguez-Pose, 2017). 
Considering non-move years only, 6.1% percent of the observations correspond to years when 
workers decrease their automation risk by moving to low-risk jobs in metro areas. The 
prevalence of downward changes in automation risk is 5.2% in large urban regions and 5.1% 
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in small regions. Similar patterns can be found when focusing on occupation mobility that 
involves upward changes in automation risk. While in metro areas 22.3% of the observations 
relate to such risk changes, in small regions this ratio is 20.7%. According to these statistics 
job mobility that involves changes in automation susceptibility increases with the size of the 
region. Moreover, job mobility is more common among movers in any type of region. 
In order to make the discussion on automation risk dynamics more concrete, it is worthwhile 
considering some typical examples of occupation mobility that involve downward/upward 
changes in automation risk. Table A2 in the Appendix lists the most common occupational 
transitions for each region type. As can be seen there, these occupational changes are 
independent of location and happen within a narrow range of activities. In most cases workers 
seem to choose occupations in which they can utilize their expertise and previously acquired 
knowledge (e.g., nurses/midwives, cashiers/salespersons, construction workers/frame builders) 
and this motivation is independent of whether the occupational switch involves downward or 
upward changes in automation risk. 
 
5. Results 
Reducing automation risk in metro areas 
We begin by estimating Eq. (2) ignoring unobservable individual heterogeneity but removing 
periods when workers moved to another region type. In this baseline multinomial logit model 
transition probabilities are explained by a set of individual characteristics such as sex, age, 
education, place of birth, having children and also a dummy for working in metro areas. Given 
that the domain of automation probability is the interval [0,1] the automation risk of the 
worker’s current occupation is also included into the model to control for further career 
upgrading opportunities. Since workers in the lower tail of the automation risk distribution 
(e.g., medical doctors, dieticians and speech therapists, see Table 1) are hardly able to further 
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reduce their automation exposure by changing occupations, one would expect that changes in 
automation risk between t+1 and t is negatively correlated with the initial risk level observed 
in period t. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the logarithm of relative risk-ratios for the baseline 
model. These estimates show that individuals in metro areas are more likely to change 
occupations than those who work elsewhere. Working in metro areas is associated with a 16.2% 
increase in the relative risk ratio of downward changes in automation risk and a 5.2% increase 
in the relative risk ratio of upward changes (relative to the baseline of no change). As discussed 
earlier, however, unobserved individual attributes such as personality traits and skills may be 
important determinants of job mobility. Because such unobservables are correlated with 
workplace location, these estimates are likely to be biased. Columns (3) and (4) report the 
maximum-likelihood estimates obtained by maximizing the conditional log-likelihood function 
in Eq (3). Since the conditional MLE removes subjects where the dependent variable does not 
vary in time, the number of observations drops by 0.8%. The results show that working in 
metro areas is associated with a significant increase (19.5%) in the odds of reducing automation 
risk by moving to less susceptible occupations versus staying in the same occupation. At the 
same time, the effect on the relative chance of upward changes drops and becomes 
insignificant. The last model in columns (5) and (6) introduces another locational dummy for 
large urban areas but the results remain unchanged. The probability of moving to jobs with 
lower automation risk is only higher in metros (relative to small regions) and working in metros 
or other large urban regions does not increase the odds of upward changes in automation 
exposure. 
Results in Table 4 suggest that only workers in metros are more likely to reduce their 
automation susceptibility through occupational changes. However, as argued in the previous 
section, a large proportion of observed job changes are horizontal movements that take place 
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between occupations with more or less similar task-contents. This naturally raises the question 
of whether metro areas only contribute to horizontal job mobility or also facilitate career 
upgrades that imply larger drops in automation risk. Since the baseline model is unable to 
answer this question at its current form, we proceed by estimating the same model with a 
threshold for minimum risk changes. By looking at changes that exceed this threshold, we can 
separately examine whether working in metros (and other large urban areas) promotes faster 
career advancement. The threshold was chosen to match the variance of annual risk changes 
(10 percentage points), which modified the set of transition alternatives in the dependent 
variable as follows: (i) moves to a job where automation risk is at least 10 percentage points 
lower (ii) moves to a job where risk is at least 10 percentage points higher, (iii) neither.10 
Point estimates for relative risk-ratios in the first two columns of Table 5 suggest that workers 
in metro areas are more likely to undertake occupation shifts that result in greater changes in 
automation risk. Working in metros is associated with a 21.9% increase in the odds of 
decreasing automation susceptibility at least 10 percentage points. Compared to metros, large 
urban areas have a much smaller impact on career upgrades which completely disappears in 
the conditional ML model that allows for fixed effects (columns 3 and 4). This model shows 
that working in metro areas increases the odds of reducing automation risk by at least 10 
percentage points (by 20.6%) and also decreases the odds of increasing automation 
susceptibility (by -11.1%). Thus, not only the chance of horizontal job mobility is higher in 
cities, but also, upward job mobility that reduces individual susceptibility to a greater extent.  
Overall, there is evidence of a broad contrast between the workers of the largest Swedish metros 
and those who work in other parts of the country. Workers in metropolitan areas are more likely 
to reduce their automation exposure through occupational mobility. Since the models are 
                                                 
10
 Given that the results may be sensitive to the choice of the threshold, we also ran the ML model using other 
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cleared of unobserved worker heterogeneity and the confounding effects of migration (by 
dropping all observations corresponding to move years) this result can be attributed to the 
dynamic career upgrading or “escalator” effect of metropolitan areas. 
 
The role of inter- and intra-firm upgrades 
 
Given that our data provide information on employer-employee matches we can distinguish 
between two types of job mobility through which automation risk can be reduced. The first is 
inter-firm mobility (when the workers move across firms), and the second is intra-firm mobility 
(when they are promoted or transferred to another job within the same firm). As argued in 
Section 2, large labour markets provide more opportunities to reduce automation risk through 
inter-firm mobility, however, the relationship between the size of the labour market and within-
firm job mobility is less clear. Wheeler (2008) argues that workers in cities converge to 
efficient job matches earlier because large urban markets allow them to try themselves in a 
wider range of jobs and thus learn more quickly about their abilities. As job turnover decreases 
with work experience in cities, intra-firm upward mobility becomes more important as a source 
of career upgrading that reduces workers’ susceptibility to automation. Since breaking up 
productive matches is not in the interest of the employer, firms in urban areas might prefer 
promoting their proven employees in order to keep them. On the other hand, if large urban 
labour markets allow firms to enhance productivity by recruiting skilled workers at lower costs 
and productivity gains from channeling external knowledge are sufficiently high, employers 
may prefer hiring new employees (poaching) over investing and promoting one of their existing 
staff members. 
To unravel the relative role of intra- and inter-firm career upgrades in the reduction of 
individual automation risk we consider another model where the dependent variable consists 
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of the following transitions: (i) moves to a job with lower automation risk within the same firm, 
(ii) moves to a job with lower automation risk in another firm, (iii) moves to a job with higher 
automation risk (iv) neither. We do not distinguish between intra- and interfirm mobility in 
case of increasing automation risk because intrafirm job changes that increase automation risk 
are rarely observed in the sample. Considering a distinct outcome for these rare events would 
thus lead to biased estimates (see e.g. King and Zeng, 2001). 
Given that the number of potential employers within the region strongly influences the 
possibility of movement between employers, we include the number of firms per 1000 persons 
as a further control. If interfirm job mobility in large cities is driven by the need to improve 
matches and to acquire new knowledge assets, the probability of interfirm upgrades should still 
be higher in cities even after controlling for the local number of firms. 
Results reported in columns 1-3 of Table 6 show that workers in metro areas are more likely to 
reduce their automation risk by changing employer and occupation at the same time. Working 
in the largest metros increases the odds of inter-firm upgrades relative to the base outcome by 
35.0% while its effect on the odds of intra-firm upgrades is only 20.1%. Similar results are 
obtained from the threshold model that looks at larger (> 10 percentage points) changes in 
automation risk (columns 4-6). According to this model, the odds of experiencing a large 
interfirm upgrade increase by 22.9% while the odds of large intrafirm upgrades increase by 
19.7%. We can thus conclude that although metros facilitate risk reduction through both inter- 
and intrafirm mobility, the primary source of within-city career upgrading is interfirm mobility. 
When we look at changes that exceed 10 percentage points, location seems to have a similar 
effect on both mobility types.11 
The finding that intra-firm upward mobility is more common in metros suggest that urban firms 
                                                 
11
 For the ‘Metro areas’ variable, the difference between the estimated relative effects on upward inter- and 
intrafirm mobility in the first model is 0.108, with z-score 1.910 (p < 0.001), while for the ‘Large urban areas’ 
variable the difference is 0.098 with 1.80 (p < 0.001). For the threshold model reported in columns 4-6, the 
difference between the effects on inter- and intrafirm mobility (0.026) is not significant. 
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provide better career opportunities for their proven employees and prefer promotion over hiring 
new employees for higher positions.12 However, this finding might be the consequence of 
automation itself. Dauth et al. (2018) found that employers react to the penetration of robot 
technologies by changing the tasks for their workers to avoid layoffs. If labour replacing 
technologies spread faster among urban firms, intra-firm job mobility might be more common 
in cities. 
 
Heterogeneous upgrades for different worker groups 
Since workers with different characteristics benefit from working in large metros to a varying 
degree, full sample estimates might obscure considerable differences between worker groups. 
In our context, examining the extent of heterogeneity in the effects of cities is crucial to identify 
groups for which long-term automation exposure is expected. For instance, it is possible that 
women are less likely than men to benefit from the career opportunities offered by cities due 
to limited access to networks, gender differences in household responsibilities and labour 
market discrimination (Rosenthal and Strange, 2012).13 Although women are generally more 
likely to fill positions with lower automation risk (e.g., nursing, teaching and different forms 
of clerical work) they are disadvantaged relative to men in opportunities for career 
advancement. 
 
Another susceptible group is immigrants whose career mobility is often hindered by the limited 
international transferability of human capital, the lack of intangible assets involving linguistic 
proficiency and access to effective search channels. Although upward mobility in occupational 
                                                 
12
 Our finding that interfirm career upgrades are more likely in metro areas is in line with the results of Andersson 
and Thulin (2013). 
13
 Forrett and Dougherty (2004) showed that there are substantial differences in networking behavior between 
women and men which might also affect the extent to which women and men can benefit from dynamic career 
upgrades in cities. 
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status might set in through economic assimilation (Chiswick et al., 2005; Rooth and Ekberg, 
2006), low mobility at the outset lead to long-term occupational mismatches by pushing 
immigrants toward high-risk routine activities for a longer period of time. In the presence of 
these disadvantages and possible labour market discrimination one would expect that cities 
make less of a contribution to reducing automation risk along immigrants’ careers. 
Educational attainment is also an important attribute by which the career upgrading effect of 
cities might vary across the members of the workforce. In general, workers with college degrees 
(or more) have better capabilities to adapt and self-renew in an evolving labour market. This 
potential for “labour branching” (MacKinnon, 2017), is because they can apply to a wider range 
of jobs, have better access to employment opportunities with the potential for career 
advancement, and therefore have a higher chance to get low-risk jobs compared to their low-
skilled peers whose job-search tend to be narrower. Recent studies on urban wage premium 
showed that for college educated workers the urban wage premium grows steadily with 
between-firm job shifts (Carlsen et al. 2016; Matano & Naticchioni, 2016). This suggests that 
the career upgrading effect of cities is expected to accrue mostly to skilled workers. 
We examine effect heterogeneity across work groups by estimating the original specification 
in its general form for each group separately.14 Each model contains controls for observed 
individual attributes, as individual fixed effects. Once again, move years are dropped from all 
models in order to get rid of the confounding “elevator effect” of migration.  
Results reported in Table 7 show considerable differences in the relative-risk ratios of region 
types. Separate estimates for female and male workers confirm the expectation that men can 
take more advantage of their work location then women. While for men the relative probability 
of reducing automation risk is increased by 37,3% in metros, for women it is increased only by 
                                                 
14 We estimate the model without any thresholds because downward changes that exceed 10 percentage points (or 
more) are rare events for most of the susceptible groups.  
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24%. Moreover, for men large urban areas also have a smaller positive effect (16%). 
Our results for immigrants are in line with the above expectations in the sense that immigrants’ 
upward mobility is constrained irrespective of their work location. Since the models filter out 
unobservables it is unlikely that our estimates reflect the lack of language skills, networking or 
other personal attributes. Apart from labour market discrimination they face, immigrants are 
often unable to utilize their human capital in the host country due to the limited international 
transferability of human capital. Even if the immigrant worker is highly qualified, in the 
absence of country-specific knowledge (such as legal practices, local norms) she/he might be 
unable to find employment in her/his own field (Rooth and Ekberg, 2006). As a result, 
immigrants’ automation risk may decrease at a slower rate throughout their careers. Since 
native workers do not face such disadvantages, they can more readily enjoy the career benefits 
of metros.  
Finally, the last rows of Table 7 provide some insights on the role of education in exploiting 
career opportunities offered by large labour markets. For low-skilled workers (less than college 
degree) we find that working in cities slightly increase the relative probability of downward 
changes in automation risk (by 18.3%), and it also reduces the chance of upward changes by 
12.3%. At the same time, in the case of workers with college degrees (or more), metros are 
associated with a 41.5% increase in the odds of downward changes in automation risk relative 
to the base outcome of no change. Although these results suggest that more educated workers 
can take advantage of the career opportunities offered by cities to a greater extent, less educated 
urban workers may have brighter career prospects in cities as well. As low-skilled service jobs 
in cities have lower automation risk, it is also easier for less educated workers to escape from 
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6. Conclusions 
Workers in small urban areas are usually depicted as being more exposed to the threat of 
technological unemployment caused by automation, because these regions tend to rely more 
on production-related routine skills and this is unlikely to change in the future (Frank et al. 
2018). In this paper we examined whether, and for whom, large cities offer career 
opportunities which might imply the reduction of automation risk. This was accomplished by 
means of matched employer-employee data covering a 10 % random sample of the Swedish 
labour force during the period 2005-2013.  
Our descriptive evidence suggest that the concentration of susceptible jobs is higher in smaller 
regions and that the urban-rural divide has increased over the period studied here (covering 
the Great Recession). In that sense, our findings confirm previous results of Crawley et al. 
(2021) that automation exposure decreases with the degree of agglomeration. By means of the 
level of detail of our data, we can however show that the groups of workers at risk of 
automation differs across the regional hierarchy. While the highest concentrations of workers 
in susceptible occupations in metro-regions are different forms of clerks and service workers, 
a greater share of manufacturing workers are at risk outside the city-regions. In that sense, the 
spatial division of labour entails that different groups of workers are at greater risk of facing 
automation-related displacement in different types of economic spaces. Given the fact that 
completely new tasks tend to occur in large cities with diversified economies where the higher 
potential for spillovers and learning fosters the birth of new activities (Duranton & Puga, 
2001), we can expect that these spatial differences also entail increasing transaction costs for 
susceptible groups of workers to adjust to the ongoing realignments of the labour markets if 
better local alternatives are deteriorating over time. Since the majority of new jobs have been 
created in the largest labour markets in Sweden (c.f., Eriksson & Hane-Weijman, 2017), and 
the remaining jobs in smaller regions are becoming increasingly susceptible as shown in the 
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results presented here, this would entail that migration to larger regions is the main viable 
strategy to adapt. Especially, because the probability of a job to appear in a region is higher if 
related jobs are already present (Muneepeerakul et al., 2013; Shutters et al., 2016), we should 
expect that the majority of new jobs in the service sector are more likely to be created in large 
cities, where the employment share of services is larger. 
The logical consequence of this finding is that workers in large cities have better chances of 
finding a non-automatable job as years go by. Our empirical results indeed show that working 
in cities have a positive and statistically significant effect on the relative probability of 
downward changes in automation risk even after controlling for a wide range of individual 
attributes influencing occupation choice and labour market opportunities. However, these 
benefits of urban life cannot be reaped without effort. Rather, it involves learning, networking 
and intense competition on the part of ambitious and skilled workers seeking for jobs that 
promise advancement in their careers. Every factor that hampers these activities impairs the 
chances of reducing the automation-driven risk of displacement. Such factors include, for 
example, the lack of skills, family background, limited access to professional networks or 
labour market discrimination. Workers who face these barriers are less likely to benefit from 
the career upgrading effect of cities. In this regard the most susceptible workers are the 
immigrants, but women and workers without college degrees also benefit relatively less from 
the career advantages cities offer.15 Hence, government responses to technology-driven labour 
market disruptions have to combine several instruments in order to be efficient for different 
groups of workers. Mobility enhancing instruments that encourage migration toward cities 
(e.g., travelling and housing allowances or improving housing accessibility) might be useful 
tools to alleviate technological unemployment (c.f., Storper, 2018) but only for the most 
                                                 
15
 The financial crisis of 2008 probably further worsened the chances of these susceptible groups and therefore 
increase the extent of effect heterogeneity between worker groups. Finding out how career upgrading in cities 
developed in different phases of the crisis is certainly a policy-relevant question that deserves further attention 
and careful empirical investigation, therefore it is left for further research. 
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skilled. In the case of more vulnerable, less-skilled, workers, the emphasis should be on 
creating general conditions for job mobility (e.g., by providing training and up-to-date 
information on the availability of low-risk jobs). 
Finally, if indeed about 46% of all jobs in the OECD face a significant risk of being replaced 
by machines in the near future as suggested by Nedelkoska & Quintini (2018), a greater 
awareness needs to be put on the fact that this will not only vary across nations but also vary 
greatly within economies. This calls for political attention and is clearly connected to the 
current debate concerned with the link between structural change and political polarization and 
discontent challenging established post-war political structures around Europe on the one hand 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), and calls for a new “place-sensitive distributed development policy” 
on the other (Storper, 2018; Iammarino et al., 2019). 
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Table 1: Automation risk of least and most susceptible occupations 
TOP 10 least susceptible occupations TOP 10 most susceptible occupationss 
Occupation title Auto. 
risk 
Occupation title Auto. 
risk 
Medical doctors 0.001 Electrical-equipment assemblers 0.908 
Dieticians 0.004 Pharmaceutical assistants 0.920 
Speech therapists 0.005 Metal wheel-grinders and tool sharpeners 0.925 
Psychologists and related professionals 0.007 Government tax and excise officials 0.930 
Teaching professionals, academic subjects 0.008 Cashiers and ticket clerks 0.934 
Geriatric nurses 0.009 Jewellery and precious-metal workers 0.950 
Medical care nurses 0.009 Debt-collectors and related workers 0.950 
District nurses 0.009 Library and filing clerks 0.958 
Special education teaching professionals 0.010 Numerical clerks 0.959 
Production managers in education 0.010 Paperboard, textile products assemblers 0.970 
 
Table 2: The most common occupations with lowest and highest automation risk in 
different region types. 
Top 5 occupations with lowest automation probability  






















Pre-primary education teaching pros 2,4
9 
Pre-primary education 
teaching associate pros 
2,
30 
Computer systems designers, 
analysts and programmers 
2,7
7 
Primary education teaching pros 2,1
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Primary education teaching pros 1,7
5 
Public service administrative pros  1,3
6 
Nursing associate pros 1,
00 
College, university and higher 
education teaching pros 
1,2
8 
Nursing associate pros 1,3
4 
Social work pros 0,
87 
Top 5 occupations with highest automation probability  


















Other office clerks 2,2
9 
Other office clerks 2,0
1 
Other office clerks 2,
04 
Helpers in restaurants 1,9
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Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on a 10% random sample of the Swedish Admin Data 
containing 3,327,846 observations for 499,507 workers. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics 
 Overall Movers Stayers 
Sex (%) 48.5 43.5 49.1 
Age (years) 42.8 37.8 43.2 
16-24 years (%) 7.5 12.5 6.9 
25-34 years (%) 21.0 32.6 19.6 
35-44 years (%) 26.3 25.7 26.3 
45-54 years (%) 24.7 18.6 25.4 
55+ years (%) 20.3 10.3 21.5 
Having a child (%) 42.7 41.2 42.9 
Born in Sweden (%) 87.8 90.7 87.4 
Less than college degree (%) 66.8 60.1 67.6 
College degree or more (%) 33.1 39.8 32.3 
Workplace location (%)    
- Metro regions 50.3 38.4 51.8 
- Large urban regions 36.6 42.6 35.9 
- Small regions 12.9 18.9 12.2 
Job changes + downward changes in auto. risk (%)    
- Metro regions 6.1 7.4 5.7 
- Large urban regions 5.2 7.0 4.9 
- Small regions 5.1 6.6 4.7 
Job changes + upward changes in auto. risk (%)    
- Metro regions 19.7 22.3 19.2 
- Large urban regions 18.9 21.0 18.3 
- Small regions 18.7 20.7 18.3 
Number of workers 499,507 58,896 440,611 
Note: Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on a 10% random sample of the Swedish Admin 
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Table 4: Multinomial logit models of changes in automation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
dep. var.:  
changes in auto. risk. 
Downward 
changes in 
auto. risk  
Upward  
changes in 
auto. risk  
Downward 
changes in 




auto. risk  
Downward 
changes in 




auto. risk  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Metro areas 1.162*** 1.052*** 1.195*** 0.983*** 1.260*** 0.955 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.032) (0.022) (0.05) (0.032) 
Large urban regions     1.067 0.966 
     (0.041) (0.030) 
Sex 1.028*** 0.951***     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Born in Sweden 1.250*** 0.912***     
 (0.009) (0.004)     
Having children 1.077*** 0.825***     
  (0.005) (0.002)     
Age 0.977*** 1.005*** 1.112*** 2.284*** 1.127*** 2.282*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
College degree or 
more 
3.404*** 0.952*** 4.212*** 0.891*** 4.212*** 0.891*** 
 (0.075) (0.048) (0.093) (0.02) (0.093) (0.020) 
Auto. risk in period t 9.3370*** 0.7100*** 16681*** 0.001*** 16681*** 0.001*** 
 (0.093) (0.004) (650.5) (0.000) (650.5) (0.000) 
Individual fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -2,455,530 -905,581 -903,582 
N 3,643,033 3,616,988 3,616,988 
Note: The table reports relative-risk ratios and their standard errors. Estimation method: 
maximum-likelihood estimator. Transition j = 0 (no change in auto. risk) is chosen as the base 
outcome. Dependent variables are measured between t and t+1, all level variables are measured 
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Table 5: Multinomial logit models of large changes in automation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 
dep. var.:  
changes in auto. risk. 
Downward 
changes 
(min 10 pps) 
Upward 
changes 
(min 10 pps) 
Downward 
changes 
(min 10 pps) 
Upward 
changes 
(min 10 pps) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Metro areas 1.219*** 1.050*** 1.206*** 0.889*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.061) (0.037) 
Large urban regions 1.040*** 0.994 1.049 0.938 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.05) (0.037) 
Sex 1.104*** 0.977***   
 (0.006) (0.003)   
Born in Sweden 1.361*** 0.890***   
 (0.012) (0.004)   
Having children 1.077*** 0.812***   
  (0.005) (0.002)   
Age 0.972*** 1.007** 1.232*** 3.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
College degree or more 2.268*** 0.990 5.104*** 0.824*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.138) (0.021) 
Auto. risk in period t 24.705*** 0.720*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.247) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual fixed effects No Yes 
Log-likelihood -2,255,048 -653.663 
N 3,643,033 3,618,007 
Note: The table reports relative-risk ratios and their standard errors (in parentheses). Estimation 
method: maximum-likelihood estimator. Transition j = 0 (changes within the range of -10 and 
10 percentage points) is chosen as the base outcome. Dependent variables are measured 
between t and t+1, all level variables are measured in t. ***, ** indicates significant at the 1 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit models of intra- and inter-firm career upgrades 


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Metro areas 1.201*** 1.350*** 0.952 1.197** 1.229** 0.887** 
 (0.064) (0.078) (0.032) (0.081) (0.090) (0.037) 
Large urban 
regions 0.993 1.220*** 0.948 1.001 1.107 0.919* 
 (0.053) (0.071) (0.031) (0.067) (0.082) (0.039) 
College 
degree or 
more 1.111*** 1.111*** 2.282*** 1.239*** 1.226*** 3.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
Age 4.133*** 4.450 0.932 4.855*** 5.165*** 0.824*** 
 (0.157) (0.116) (0.021) (0.223) (0.165) (0.021) 
Number of 
firms (per 
1000 persons) 0.998 1.003*** 0.999 0.997* 1.003* 0.999 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Automation 
risk in period t 21332.8*** 13030.0*** 0.000*** 550179.6*** 271305.3*** 0.000*** 
 (1066.639) (651.494) (0.000) (37962.4) (18720.0) (0.000) 
Individual 





N 3,616,988 3,616,007 
Note: The table reports relative-risk ratios and their standard errors (in parentheses). Standard 
errors are clustered by regions. Estimation method: maximum-likelihood estimator. Base 
outcome: no change in auto. risk Dependent variables are measured between t and t+1, all level 
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects by worker groups 
dep. var.:  
changes in auto. risk. 
Downward changes in auto. 
risk 
Upward changes in auto. risk 
  (1) (2) 
Female     
     Metro areas 1.275*** (0.069) 0.944 (0.042) 
     Large urban areas 1.028 (0.051) 0.994 (0.041) 
Male     
     Metro areas 1.443*** (0.087) 0.966 (0.049) 
     Large urban areas 1.183** (0.067) 0.928 (0.044) 
Swedish     
     Metro areas 1.357*** (0.057) 0.859 (0.030) 
     Large urban areas 1.028 (0.04) 0.994 (0.032) 
Immigrant     
     Metro areas 1.186 (0.179) 0.859 (0.105) 
     Large urban areas 0.951 (0.139) 1.010 (0.119) 
Less than college degree     
     Metro areas 1.183** (0.062) 0.877** (0.039) 
     Large urban areas 1.070 (0.051) 0.952 (0.038) 
College degree or more     
     Metro areas 1.415*** (0.103) 1.050 (0.061) 
     Large urban areas 1.054 (0.073) 0.953 (0.051) 
Note: Each model contains individual fixed effects and controls for age, education and auto. 
risk in period t. Education controls are not included in the last two models (less than college & 
college or more). The table reports log relative-risk ratios, their standard errors (in parentheses), 
and relative risk ratios (in brackets). The base outcome is “no change in auto. risk”. Dependent 
variables are measured between t and t+1, all level variables are measured in t. ***, ** and * 
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Table A1: Summary statistics for region types 
 
Metro regions (N=3) Large regions (N=19) Small regions (N=50) 
 
2005 2013 Ch. 2005 2013 Ch. 2005 2013 Ch. 
Population 4 327 353 4 760 110 10.0% 3 429 596 3 544 470 3.3% 1 356 308 1 340 284 -1.2% 
Employment 1 895 669 2 119 017 11.8% 1 418 748 1 442 349 1.7% 551 405 546 018 -1.0% 
Median income 3025.9 3350.4 10.7% 2872.0 3205.0 11.6% 2730.6 3083.2 12.9% 
College degree 33.5% 38.4% 5.0 26.8% 30.8% 4.0 19.8% 22.2% 2.3 
Manufacturing 14.7% 11.0% -3.7 20.8% 16.4% -4.4 22.3% 18.8% -3.5 
SSYK 7-8 5.8% 4.5% -1.3 11.7% 9.4% -2.3 12.9% 11.6% -1.3 
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Table A2: Most frequent occupation switches in different region types 
Metro areas Diff. in 
auto. risk.   Source occupation Target occupation 
Decreasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing associate professionals Nursing and midwifery professionals -0.001 
2 Metal-processing-plant operators Metal- and mineral-products machine operators -0.025 
3 Mining and construction labourers Building frame and related trades workers -0.055 
4 Computer associate professionals Computing professionals -0.071 
5 Wood treaters, cabinet-makers Building frame and related trades workers -0.117 
Increasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing and midwifery professionals Nursing associate professionals 0.001 
2 Legislators and senior government officials Production and operations managers 0.071 
3 Housekeepers and related workers Helpers in restaurants 0.078 
4 Architects, engineers and related professionals Physical and engineering science technicians 0.035 
5 Special education teaching professionals Other teaching professionals 0.031 
Large urban areas  
  Source occupation Target occupation   
Decreasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing associate professionals Nursing and midwifery professionals -0.001 
2 Mining and construction labourers Building frame and related trades workers -0.055 
3 Tellers Stall salespersons -0.148 
4 Metal-processing-plant operators Metal- and mineral-products machine operators -0.025 
5 Physicists, chemists and related professionals Architects, engineers and related professionals -0.035 
Increasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing and midwifery professionals Nursing associate professionals 0.001 
2 Legislators and senior government officials Production and operations managers 0.071 
3 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers Textile-, leather-products machine operators 0.148 
4 Architects, engineers and related professionals Physical and engineering science technicians 0.035 
5 Housekeepers and related workers Helpers in restaurants 0.078 
Small regions  
  Source occupation Target occupation   
Decreasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing associate professionals Nursing and midwifery professionals -0.001 
2 Tellers Stall salespersons -0.148 
3 Police officers and detectives Public service administrative professionals -0.399 
4 Helpers in restaurants Housekeepers and related workers -0.078 
5 Crop and animal producers Animal producers and related workers -0.234 
Increasing auto. risk  
1 Nursing and midwifery professionals Nursing associate professionals 0.001 
2 Legislators and senior government officials Production and operations managers 0.071 
3 Architects, engineers and related professionals Physical and engineering science technicians 0,035 
4 Other sales and services elementary occup Manufacturing labourers 0.051 
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Figure 2: Changes in automation risk and employment density (2005-2013) 
